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Abstract
The business literature and recent descriptive evidence show that exporting firms typi-
cally require the help of foreign trade intermediaries or need to set up own foreign wholesale
affiliates. In contrast, conventional trade theory models assume that producers can directly
access foreign consumers. This paper introduces intermediaries in an international trade
model where producers differ with respect to productivity as well as regarding their varieties’
perceived quality and tradability. We assume that trade intermediation is prone to frictions
due to the absence of enforceable cross-country contracts while own wholesale subsidiaries
require capital investment. We derive the sorting pattern of firms according to their degree
of competitive advantage and show how the relative prevalence of intermediation depends
on the degree of heterogeneity among producers, on the importance of market-specificity of
goods, or on expropriation risk. We use US export data for 50 sectors and 133 destination
countries to check the empirical validity of this predictions and find robust empirical support.
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1 Introduction
The international business literature (e.g., Peng and Ilinitch, 1998) has long emphasized that
firms typically require an own wholesale affiliate or a trade intermediary in the foreign country
to become successful exporters of final goods. The optimal organizational choice between these
two major export modes is an important issue for firms’ internationalization strategies. However,
conventional trade models assume that exporters sell directly to foreign end-clients. This may
be an innocuous assumption for many important questions. However, it bars a more profound
understanding of those components of international trade costs that are unrelated to trade policy
or geographical distance but are endogenously determined through the interaction of firms in
the presence of frictions.1
Recent empirical evidence documents the importance of trade intermediation. Blum et al.
(2010a) show that 41% of all Chilean imports are done by trade intermediaries (wohlesalers
or retailers). Berndard et al. (2010c) document that 43% of U.S. exporting firms and 55% of
importing firms are trade intermediaries; they amount to 9 and 16% of total trade volumes,
respectively. These findings relate well to Akerman (2010), who studies Swedish firm level data
and finds that 15% of total Swedish export volume is due to wholesalers. Abel-Koch (2010)
draws on survey data from Turkey and reports that only about 51% of all exporters do not rely
on trade intermediaries. While the empirical literature is still young, there is already impressive
and detailed evidence in favor of our working hypothesis, namely, that trade intermediation is
empirically relevant.
Based on these facts, a theoretical literature has begun to analyze the positive and the nor-
mative implications of trade intermediation; see the discussion of related papers below. We
contribute to the positive strand of work and offer a theoretical as well as an empirical per-
spective. We suggest a simple theoretical framework in which exporters face a choice of how to
export to foreign markets. That is essentially an organizational choice as domestic producers
can either provide distribution services abroad through an own foreign wholesale affiliate, or
1Trade costs beyond transportation and tariffs are estimated to be substantial despite recent progress in
transportation and communication technologies. For example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report that
retail and wholesale distribution costs are equivalent to an ad valorem tax of 55 percent, thereby dwarfing other
types of trade costs.
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through a specialized firm: a trade intermediary. In our model, due to the lack of enforceable
cross-border contracts, intermediation entails a distortion that leads to lower export revenues.
This is a disadvantage compared to the use of an own wholesale affiliate; however, intermediaries
make capital investments of producers in the foreign country redundant, thereby offering savings
in fixed distribution costs.
Our paper innovates along three lines: First, we cast the above choice of export modes in
a Melitz (2003)-type model where firms differ with respect to the idiosyncratic components of
variable distribution costs or preferences as well as with respect to their labor productivity. We
derive a sorting pattern of monopolistic firms over different export modes. Second, embedding
the organizational choice of producers into a multi-country trade model with trade-cost asym-
metries, we show how the relative prevalence of intermediation depends on various exogenous
variables. Third, we use US census data to provide an empirical check of our results.
We model trade intermediaries as important institutions in the operation of real-world inter-
national business. Trade intermediaries enjoy easier access to foreign markets due to better local
knowledge and the exploitation of economies of scope. However, new advances in the literature
on the boundaries of the firm (e.g., Antras and Helpman, 2004) stress the lack of enforceable
contracts in international transactions. In the context of our model, the trade intermediary can
hold-up the producer as customizing goods for foreign markets implies relationship-specific in-
vestment. Prices and quantities are determined in a game between producers and intermediaries:
the optimal response of the producer is to restrict output for the export market, which drives
up consumer prices and lowers transaction volumes. The trade-off between fixed-cost savings
and lower revenue pins down the producers’ optimal organizational mode of exporting.
Facing a hold-up problem, producers may wish to internalize sales activities by setting up
an own wholesale affiliate. Internalization forgoes the fixed-cost savings available with interme-
diation, but avoids relationship-specific distortions. We derive an interesting sorting pattern:
firms with highly marketable goods, strong brand reputation, and high productivity internal-
ize foreign sales activities, while those with medium realizations of those variables prefer to use
trade intermediaries. The relevant firm characteristics correlate with firm size, so that the paper
predicts selection of firms along their sizes.
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Besides the predicted sorting pattern, our framework has additional testable implications.
Thanks to the general equilibrium nature of our model, we can derive structural relation-
ships that can be tested econometrically in a consistent way. First, and in contrast to the
concentration-proximity trade-off, the prevalence of sales through trade intermediaries relative
to sales through own wholesale affiliates does not depend on variable trade costs between two
countries like tariffs or freight rates. Second, relative prevalence decreases in the strength of
contractual imperfections (which may be good/sector-specific) but it increases in the (country-
specific) risk of expropriation of physical capital in the foreign country. Third, relative prevalence
increases as firms become more homogeneous in terms of their underlying characteristics (pro-
ductivity, brand reputation, marketability of goods). We test these predictions on US export
data for 50 sectors and 133 destination countries.
Our work is related to at least three important strands of literature. First, on the theoretical
side, recent work has studied the organizational form of multinational firms. As Grossman
and Helpman (2002) or Antras and Helpman (2004, 2008) we allow for the lack of enforceable
cross-country contracts to affect the boundaries of firms while within-country or within-firm
transactions are not subject to similar frictions.2 Whereas their focus is on a sourcing decision
which involves the location of input production, we analyze the pattern of sourcing distribution
services.3 More recently, Felbermayr and Jung (2009a) and Antras and Costinot (2010a, 2010b)
use the matching function approach (already used by Grossman and Helpman (2002), albeit
in a different context) to model frictions and rent sharing on the market for intermediation.
This setup allows to derive the normative implications of intermediation. Finally, Petropoulou
(2008a, 2008b) has developed models which do not rely on a matching function approach but
rather study the endogenous emergence of networks that link producers and consumers.
2As in the afore-mentioned papers, we use a property-rights approach to contractual imperfections. Other
authors have proposed agency-based mechanisms, see for example Horstmann and Markusen (1995). Interme-
diaries may possess better information on their markets than foreign producers which opens the possibility for
the existence of informational rents as they required additional incentives to incur sales efforts. As in our setup,
agency-based frictions would imply that intermediation pushes up prices in the foreign markets so that hetero-
geneous firms would sort into distribution modes much in the same way that is predicted by our model. The
property-rights approach with its focus on contractability has the advantage that for many of its determinants
empirically meaningful and established proxy variables exist.
3Lafontaine and Slade (2007) survey theory and evidence on the sourcing decision, and on retailing. Note that
we do not explicitly model a retail sector but rather focus on organization of exports.
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Second, a number of recent papers discusses the endogenous sorting of firms into different
modes of serving foreign markets. In Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) [henceforth: HMY]
firms either produce locally and export to a foreign market, or they engage in horizontal FDI and
produce abroad.4 In contrast to the standard proximity-concentration trade-off, in our model
no trade cost savings arise. More closely related to the present paper, Blum et al. (2010b)
analyze the endogenous sorting of producers over distribution modes. In line with our results,
they predict that exporters with low levels of productivity use intermediaries while the most
productive ones engage in direct exports.5 Akerman (2010) develops a theory of wholesalers in
international trade based on economies of scope. He is able to endogenize the product breadth
of wholesalers. However, he also finds that firms with average levels of productivity choose trade
intermediation as the preferred international distribution mode.
Third, the theoretical model provided by HMY has been tested by HMY themselves and other
authors using different data sources. Another related empirical study is the one by Bernard et al.
(2010b) who provide evidence that products’ revealed contractability plays a role in explaining
the intra-firm share of imports. We also draw on Nunn (2007) who computes a measure that
can be viewed as product specificity at a disaggregated level.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
solves the game between the trade intermediary and the producer. Section 3 derives the key
propositions of the paper: it shows how firms sort into different export modes according to their
attributes and derives predictions on the relative prevalence of either export modes and the
trade-FDI relationship in general equilibrium. Section 4 provides tentative empirical evidence,
and Section 5 concludes.6
4Krautheim (2010) proposes a similar model where firms can also engage in export-supporting FDI.
5Ahn et al. (2010) use a special case of our setup (the variable trade cost disadvantage of intermediation is
assumed rather than micro-founded).
6Proofs of our results, intermediate steps of calculations, and a number of supplementary tables are contained
in the working paper version of this paper (Felbermayr and Jung, 2009b).
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2 Model setup
In this section we describe a model with heterogeneous firms akin to Melitz (2003) in which
we introduce the endogenous emergence of trade intermediaries. Besides its focus on firms’
choice of export mode, our model differs from existing treatments in that it allows for a broader
characterization of firm heterogeneity. Our general equilibrium approach has the advantage that
it generates closed-form relationships between the relative prevalence of export modes and its
observable exogenous determinants, thereby allowing for econometric validation of the model’s
predictions.
The world consists of N countries, indexed j = 1, ..., N, which may differ according to the size
of their labor forces. In each country, heterogeneous firms produce varieties of a differentiated
good and interact under conditions of monopolistic competition. We allow for exogenous firm
turnover, so that in a stationary environment at each instant of time a measure δ¯ > 0 of firms
dies and enters. Firm death is the only source of discounting.
2.1 Demand structure
Each country j is populated by a representative household who inelastically supplies Lj units of
labor to a perfectly competitive labor market. Preferences are a CES aggregate of differentiated
goods, each indexed by ω:
Uj =
[∫
ω∈Ωj
[ζ (ω)xij (ω)]
ρ dω
]1/ρ
. (1)
The parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1) describes the degree of substitutability between any pair of varieties.
Ωj is the set of available varieties in country j. The quantity xij (ω) denotes consumption of a
variety produced in country i, i = 1, ..., N. Our specification slightly generalizes the standard
CES case in that it adds the parameter ζ (ω) ≥ 0 which captures the brand reputation of variety
ω as perceived by the household.7 The larger ζ (ω), the bigger is the contribution of variety ω
7Combes et al. (2005) introduce a similar weighting factor in their representation of utility.
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to overall utility.8
Each variety is produced by a single firm. Despite the existence of operational profits of
successful firms, ex ante expected profits are driven to zero by free entry. In equilibrium,
aggregate operational profits are exactly matched by firms’ total setup costs. Thus, labor is the
only source of income.
Maximizing (1) subject to the respective budget constraint, we find the following demand
function for a variety ω from country i
xij (ω) = Hj
ζ (ω)σ−1
pij (ω)
σ , (2)
where Hj ≡ wjLjP σ−1j . Pj =
(∫ nj
0 [pij (ω) /ζ (ω)]
1−σ dω
)1/(1−σ)
is the price index dual to (1),
nj is the measure of the set Ωj , σ ≡ 1/ (1− ρ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
varieties, and wj denotes the wage rate.
2.2 Product heterogeneity and exporting via own wholesale affiliates
Monopolistically competitive producers differ with respect to a vector of characteristics
{ζ (ω) , τ (ω) , a (ω)} , where ζ (ω) is the parameter for brand reputation introduced above, a (ω) >
0 denotes the labor input requirement for producing one unit of variety ω, and τ (ω) ≥ 1 refers to
variety-specific variable distribution costs of the iceberg type, which measure the ease at which
a variety is brought to the consumer (marketability). Realistically, we assume that this cost
occurs regardless of whether a good is traded internationally or not. However, in international
transactions, total variable trade costs are τij (ω) = τ¯ijτ (ω) , where τ¯ij ≥ 1 accounts for trans-
portation costs from country i to country j and may be thought of as a function of distance.
We refer to τ¯ij as to the systematic component of trade costs, and of τ (ω) as the idiosyncratic
component.9
8 In principle, our setting allows to read equation (1) as a CES production function of a competitive final
output good producer. Then, we study trade in inputs rather than in final goods. The predictions of the model
do not hinge on the interpretation. This conceptual flexibility facilitates the empirical exercise of Section 4, since
the data do not allow to distinguish trade in final goods from trade in inputs.
9Bergin and Glick (2007) also discuss variety-specific trade costs.
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Firm ω’s variable cost function in country i is given by ci (ω) = y (ω) a (ω)wi where y (ω)
is the quantity of output. Regarding their cost structure, firms do not differ across countries.
We map the vector of firm characteristics {ζ (ω) , τ (ω) , a (ω)} into a scalar measure of effective
firm-level productivity Φ (ω) ≡ ζ (ω) / [a (ω) τ (ω)] . It turns out that Q ≡ Φσ−1 is a measure of
competitive advantage which fully characterizes firm behavior.
Following the structure of the entry process introduced by Hopenhayn (1992) and simplified
in Melitz (2003), prospective entrants are uncertain about their respective values of Φ. Only
after entry, which requires sinking the cost fE , Φ is revealed and remains constant afterwards.
We assume that Φ follows the Pareto distribution. More precisely, we let the c.d.f. be G (Φ) =
1− Φ−k, with a shape parameter k > max {2, σ − 1} and the support [1,+∞) .10 Note that we
need not restrict in any way the stochastic processes that govern the components of Φ (ω) .
Along with variable distribution costs τ (ω) , there are also fixed distribution costs. These
costs are associated to warehousing, the maintenance of customer relations, or regulatory bur-
dens. Without loss of generality, given perfect capital markets, we can express investment costs
as flow costs. Flow fixed distribution costs are expressed in terms of labor and are given by
fj = fwj , where f is the labor requirement that is constant over all countries. We assume, that
a firm from country i has to pay fi when selling to its home market, but that the cost of an
own foreign representation is given by fij = φijfj , with φij > 1 for i 6= j, and φii = 1, so that
firms’ fixed distribution costs in the foreign country are higher than in the home economy. In
contrast, trade intermediaries are assumed to originate in country j so that they enjoy cheaper
access to foreign markets than foreign producers. Whenever i 6= j, we call fij wholesale FDI.11
The fact that producers face higher fixed distribution costs abroad may have two reasons.
First, trade costs may simply have a firm-specific fixed component which is larger in foreign
markets due to additional costs associated to linguistic, legal or informational issues. Second,
10The Pareto assumption has been made in a large number of related papers (e.g., HMY, Chaney (2008),
Helpman et al. (2008), Bernard et al. (2010a)). The Pareto allows for closed form solutions. The assumption
k > 2 makes sure that the variance of the productivity distribution is well-defined, and k > σ− 1 guarantees that
the equilibrium distribution of firm sizes has a finite mean. The dispersion of firms’ competitive advantages is
inversely related to the shape parameter.
11In principle, the sales representative could also be located domestically. However, our preferred interpretation
allows to view fij as wholesale FDI. Krautheim (2010) uses the term export-supporting FDI instead of wholesale
FDI. Essentially, this is just a reinterpretation of the fixed costs of exporting in the original Melitz (2003) model.
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φij may represent the risk that a foreign government expropriates the affiliate (i.e., its offices,
warehouses, etc.). To see this, let δij denote the Poisson rate of expropriation, and assume that
δii = 0 for the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality. Then, φij would be equal to(
δ¯ + δij
)
/δ¯ which is a strictly increasing function of δij . Hence, the risk of expropriation works
just as a higher depreciation rate on foreign assets.
We want to understand how differences in terms of competitive advantage Q across producers
determine their choice of foreign market entry mode: through wholly owned foreign sales affiliates
or through trade intermediaries. For that purpose, we first briefly show how profits achieved
through foreign sales affiliates depend on Q. Discussion of profits through intermediation is less
standard and discussed in more detail in the next section.
The monopolist generates non-negative profits from exporting via an own wholesale affiliate,
if export revenues suffice to cover the annuitized costs of foreign investment φijfj and the
additional variable production costs.12 Profits from exporting through an own wholesale affiliate
are τij (ω) ·Hj [τij (ω) p (ω)]−σ ζ (ω)σ−1 · [p (ω)− a (ω)wi]−φijfi. Using the monopolist’s optimal
pricing rule, this gives
piAij (Q) = (wiτ¯ij)
1−σ BjQ− φijfj , (3)
where the systematic part of trade costs τ¯1−σij appears as a determinant of variable profits, along
with the measure of foreign market size Bj , and the costs of investing abroad, φijfj . Profits
increase in the degree of competitive advantage Q and market size Bj ; they fall in effective unit
costs wiτ¯ij , additional costs associated to linguistic, informational, or legal issues φij , and the
fixed costs of maintaining the foreign distribution network fj .13
2.3 Trade intermediation
Assumptions. An intermediary is “...an economic agent who purchases from suppliers for
resale or who helps sellers and buyers to meet and transact” (Spulber, 1996). We view trade
intermediaries as wholesale agents that facilitate transactions between producers and consumers
12Recall the assumption of perfect capital markets.
13Note that domestic sales are nested with τ¯ii = φii = 1.
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from different countries. The scope of the present paper being on the sorting behavior of
heterogeneous producers over distribution modes, we keep the intermediation sector as simple as
possible and abstract from interesting features such as strategic behavior amongst intermediaries
(see Petropoulou (2008a,b) on this) or their organizational structure. Trade intermediaries
benefit from economies of scale since there are fixed distribution costs. They have the same fixed
distribution costs as producers in that country would have, fj = fwj , since they are incorporated
in the foreign country.14 We do not explicitly model a retail sector; our assumption of variable
trade costs accruing also for domestic sales capturing in a parsimonious way the cost of retailing
when there are no specific contractual or strategic interactions between wholesalers and retailers
(which we rule out in this paper).
Our model accommodates trade intermediaries that have diversified product portfolios. Under
general circumstances, the pricing and the product range choice of intermediaries interact in a
complicated way due to a cannibalization effect. However, under monopolistic competition,
intermediaries do not internalize the effect of an additional variety on demand of the other
varieties, such that pricing and product-range decisions are independent; see Bernard et al.
(2010a) for a related model of multi-product producers. We may also reconcile our model with
economies of scope. When fixed costs of distribution depend on the number of varieties sold,
intermediaries determine their product range such that those costs are minimized. Assuming an
interior solution to this problem, we may think of f as the minimum fixed distribution cost. As
intermediaries are identical in our model, they all share the same fixed costs.15
Finally, we assume that producers and intermediaries cannot write enforceable cross-country
contracts on quantities and prices and that the variety to be exchanged features some export
market specificity. This might be the case if the product has to meet some specific technical
standards that prevent it from being fully ‘recycled’ on a different market.16 The lack of ex
14The intermediary’s specific knowledge could also translate into lower variable (distribution) costs. However,
the largest portion of variable distribution costs such as transportation services, taxes, etc. are the same across
export modes.
15Felbermayr and Jung (2009a) study fixed market access costs which depend on the tightness of the matching
market between producers and intermediaries.
16This ‘recycling’ process may be, of course, a metaphor for many things: sales in the foreign market may
require market-specific adjustments, so that selling a shipment elsewhere requires undoing these changes; one
could also think about a situation where, in case of disagreement, a delivery needs to be shipped back from the
foreign country to the producer, thereby causing additional transportation costs.
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ante contracts exposes the producer to potential hold-up: the intermediary can deny the order
ex post, i.e., after production has taken place. This assumption is crucial in that it provides an
endogenous rationale for lower variable revenues when the producer opts for the intermediated
export mode. Variants of this assumption have been used by Grossman and Helpman (2002) or
in Antras and Helpman (2004, 2008) in the context of vertical relations between final goods and
intermediate inputs producers (outsourcing).17
The game between producers and trade intermediaries. As in Antras and Costinot
(2010a), there is an infinitely elastic supply of trade intermediaries in every country. Each
producer P who finds it optimal to export via a trade intermediary M , makes a take-it-or-leave-
it offer, which specifies an upfront-fee for participation T (ω) in the relationship that has to be
paid by M. This fee can be positive or negative, and may be interpreted as a franchising fee
paid by M to P or as a down-payment of P to M towards financing fixed foreign distribution
costs.18 There is full information on product characteristics ω, so that prospective intermediaries
would know that a variety offered by some producer is already sold by another intermediary.
In that case, both intermediaries would see their operative profits driven to zero by Bertrand
competition and would thereby not be able to recover T . It follows that all producer-dealer
relationships in equilibrium must be exclusive dealership arrangements in that each producer is
matched to at most one intermediary in every market.
With the supply of M infinitely elastic, M ’s profits from the relationship net of the par-
ticipation fee in equilibrium are equal to its outside option, which we have set zero. Hence,
T (ω) will indeed differ across varieties: the higher the competitive advantage of a variety, the
larger the fee that the producer can extract from the trade intermediary. However, while perfect
competition for producers leaves trade intermediaries without rents ex post, they can still hold
17The fact that intermediation is a variable cost intensive mode can be rationalized differently as well. It may
be possible for the producer to buy insurance against hold-up risks from banks that offer trade credit. Then, the
fee for this insurance appears as variable trade costs. On a competitive financial market, that fee will factor in
the possibility that the intermediary can hold up the bank. The scope for such behavior again depends on things
like product specificity and contractual incompleteness.
18We assume an infinitely elastic supply of intermediaries plus fixed participation fees for convenience rather
than realism. Otherwise we could not treat intermediaries as footloose but would have to make (necessarily
arbitrary) decisions on where intermediaries spend their profits. For this, it is also necessary to make T variety-
specific.
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up the producers. Due to the lack of enforceable contracts, the producer cannot be sure to
receive adequate payment for the output delivered to the trade intermediary. The latter can
refuse delivery until the price is low enough. We assume that the countervailing incentives of
producers and intermediaries are sorted out via the usual asymmetric Nash bargaining process,
where β¯ij ∈ [0, 1] is the bargaining power of a producer from country i with a trade intermedi-
ary located in country j. At the bargaining stage, the producer is particularly vulnerable since
production costs are sunk at the time of bargaining. If bargaining fails, the producer can recycle
the goods that were meant for exports, thereby partly recovering a fraction λij ∈ [0, 1] of the
inputs used in production.19
We may summarize the sequencing of the game between the intermediary M and the pro-
ducer P. First, the producer P effectively auctions an exclusive dealership relationship with a
trade intermediary. Second, if some M has accepted the offer, P decides about the quantity
τij (ω)xMij (ω) to produce for the purpose of exports.
20 Finally, P delivers the goods to M, M
sells the goods, and P and M bargain about sharing of revenues (and, thereby, implicitly, about
a transaction price).21
As usual, the game is solved by backward induction. The joint surplus generated on the
foreign market is given by
Jij (ω) = pMij (ω)x
M
ij
[
pMij (ω)
]− p˜iPij (ω)− fj , (4)
where xMij
[
pMij (ω)
]
is the level of foreign demand at a c.i.f. price pMij (ω) and fj = fwj is fixed
foreign costs of distribution incurred by M .
The producer’s outside option p˜iPij (ω) is the amount of the numeraire input that firm ω can
19Note that λij measures how specific the product is to the respective export market.
20xMij (ω) is the quantity demanded by foreign consumers, which implies the production of τij (ω)x
M
ij (ω) units
due to loss in transit.
21An alternative approach would be to consider a repeated game between intermediaries and producers. To
make things interesting, one would have to assume heterogeneity among intermediaries; see Aeberhardt et al.
(2010).
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recover when bargaining fails
p˜iPij (ω) = λijτij (ω)x
M
ij (ω) a (ω)wi, (5)
where τij (ω)xMij (ω) is the amount of production required to deliver the quantity x
M
ij to the
foreign market. If λij = 0, there is no alternative use for the goods delivered to the foreign
market; if λij = 1, production can be entirely and costlessly unwinded.
The Nash solution of the bargaining problem between the producer and the intermediary
requires that M receives a pay-off
(
1− β¯ij
)
Jij (ω), while the producer gets β¯ijJij (ω) + p˜iPij (ω) .
Predicting its share of the surplus at the bargaining stage, the producer chooses the optimal
quantity to supply to the intermediary. She solves
max
xMij (ω)
β¯ijJij (ω) + p˜iPij (ω)− xMij (ω) τij (ω) a (ω)wi (6)
subject to the demand function (2). The quantity choice of the producer finally determines the
price that the consumer in the foreign country ends up paying. The following lemma states that
price.
Lemma 1 (Pricing behavior) The c.i.f. price charged for imports from country i into the
foreign market j is given by
pMij (ω) =
1
βij
1
ρ
τij (ω) a (ω)wi, (7)
where 1βij =
1−λij(1−β¯ij)
β¯ij
≥ 1 is an additional markup over marginal costs. 1βij measures the
severity of the distortion caused by the lack of contracts.
The foreign price is determined as effective marginal costs τij (ω) a (ω)wi multiplied by a
total markup 1/(βijρ) ≥ 1 over effective marginal costs τij (ω) a (ω)wi. The markup 1/ρ usually
arises in a model with monopolistic competition and CES preferences. However, it is magnified
by an additional factor 1/βij that arises due to the export market specificity of the product and
lack of enforceable contracts. It is endogenously pinned down by the parameters governing the
bargaining process and by the ease at which products can be recycled. The intuition for the
additional markup is the following: At the bargaining stage, the producer appropriates only a
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share β¯ij of the surplus. Therefore the firm optimally restricts the output below the level that
would be optimal without intermediation.
If the producer has all the bargaining power (i.e., β¯ij = 1) or if she can recycle the output
at no costs, then the additional markup vanishes. If output, however, is totally specialized, the
additional markup factor is only driven by the bargaining power.22 In the limiting case where
the producer has no clout in the bargaining, the additional markup goes to infinity regardless
of the recycling rate. 23 Moreover, the additional markup is decreasing in the bargaining power
β¯ij and in the recycling rate λij for any given λij ∈ [0, 1) and β¯ij ∈ (0, 1), respectively.
If the producer has incomplete bargaining power (i.e., β¯ij > 1) or her products are not fully
recyclable, the c.i.f. price charged for imports via trade intermediaries is larger than the one
for imports via wholesale affiliates: pMij (ω) > p
A
ij (ω) . One may relate the pricing rule (7) to the
double marginalization problem that appears in vertical relationships of monopolistic firms.24
Both, higher trade costs τ¯ij and the hold-up problem imply a higher consumer price. However,
there is a crucial difference between iceberg-type trade costs and the effect of frictions 1/βij . The
former drives up the c.i.f. price as the delivery of a good to a foreign market requires the use of
specific services which require resources in proportion to the price of the good. In contrast, the
holdup problem drives up the c.i.f. price because producers optimally reduce supply, thereby
moving up the demand schedule.
Finally, potential intermediaries compete for contracts with producers, so that they end up
bidding their entire ex post profits
(
1− β¯ij
)
Jij (ω) as participation fees T (ω) . The profits that
a producer P makes on the foreign market using an intermediary are given by the optimal
value of (6) plus the participation fee T (ω) that the producer receives. The producer’s pay-off
from the bargaining stage, plus income from the participation fee, minus variable production
costs, all evaluated at the optimal price pMij (ω) , give her total profit from exporting via a trade
22These statements immediately follow from the definition of βij .
23limβ¯ij→0 βij = 0.
24In Grossman and Helpman (2002), a similar pricing rule emerges in the context of outsourcing with homoge-
neous firms.
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intermediary as
piMij (Q) =
(
wiτ¯ij
β˜ij
)1−σ
BjQ− fj , (8)
where we have replaced the firm index ω with Q. The term β˜ij ≡ [βij + (1− βij)σ]
1
σ−1 βij ∈
[βij , 1] is endogenously determined as a function of effective bargaining power βij
(
β¯ij , λij
)
and
the elasticity of substitution σ.
In general, the lack of complete contracts reduces the slope of the profit function piMij (Q)
in a similar way than an increase in iceberg trade costs τ¯ij would. For given Q, the variable
component of profits is always smaller when the producer chooses a trade intermediary than
when the producer establishes an own wholesale affiliate. Despite the fact that the producer
does not directly lay out the fixed cost expenditure fj in the foreign market, those costs are
nevertheless entirely deducted from the producer’s profit. This is due to the fact that the
producer extracts all profits from the intermediary when setting the participation fee T. Hence,
fixed distribution costs are fully rolled-over from the intermediary to the producer.
3 The choice of export modes
3.1 Sorting of firms
Firms partition endogenously into different modes along their degree of competitive advantage.
The weakest firms do not even take up domestic production as they generate insufficient revenue
to cover fixed domestic distribution costs fi. The firm that is exactly indifferent between serving
the domestic market or not is identified by the condition QDi = w
σ−1
i fi/Bi. Firms may export
and do so using different export modes. The producer that is indifferent between exporting
through a trade intermediary and selling on the domestic market only is given by the condition
piMij
(
QMij
)
= 0, which can be solved for the cutoff value QMij :
QMij =
(
wiτ¯ij
β˜ij
)σ−1
fjB
−1
j . (9)
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Finally, the producer with competitive advantage QFij achieves identical profits from serving the
foreign market in either export modes: piMij
(
QFij
)
= piFij
(
QFij
)
. This indifference condition pins
down a second cutoff level
QFij = (wiτ¯ij)
σ−1
(
φij − 1
1− β˜σ−1ij
)
fjB
−1
j . (10)
Figure 1 relates the firms’ sorting pattern to their degree of competitive advantage.25
Figure 1: Firms sort into different export modes according to competitive advantage Q
−φijf
via inter-
πmodeij
−f
πDi
πFij
πMij
Q
Exit Domestic
sales
only
Exports
mediary
Exports
via FDI
QMij Q
F
ij
QDi
1
If the foreign market becomes larger, firms with low competitiveness start exporting through
trade intermediaries. Moreover, it becomes attractive for some of the existing exporters to set
up own wholesale affiliations. Hence, both cutoffs QMij and Q
F
ij move into the same direction.
The same holds true if the fixed costs of exporting fj , the wage rate wj , or variable transport
costs τ¯ij decline. In contrast, an increase in the risk of expropriation does not affect entry into
exporting through a trade intermediary, but makes exporting through an own wholesale affiliate
25This picture is related to Figure 1 in HMY, where the sorting of firms into exporters and firms producing
abroad also involves a trade-off between fixed and variable costs, in their case the proximity-concentration trade-
off. In the present context, the trade-off is between variable revenue and fixed costs of foreign market access.
And, importantly, the slope of the profit functions shown in Figure 1 is endogenously determined as a function of
the producers’ bargaining power β¯ij , the technology parameter λij , and the elasticity of substitution σ.
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less attractive. When the bargaining power of the producer β¯ij is higher in some export market
or her outside option better, the loss of revenue implied by intermediation is smaller.26 Hence,
QMij shifts to the left. However, an increase in β¯ij makes an own wholesale affiliate less attractive,
shifting QFij in the opposite direction.
27
We can now use Figure 1 and state the first proposition of our paper.
Proposition 1 Intermediaries and wholesale affiliates coexist and are both used by strictly
positive non-overlapping masses of producers from country i for their exports to country j if
β˜1−σij < φij . Under this condition, producers endogenously select into export modes along their
degree of competitive advantage. Firms with low marginal costs, easily tradeable variants, or a
strong brand reputation establish own wholesale affiliates. Those with intermediate values of the
above characteristics make use of a trade intermediary.
The existence condition β˜1−σij < φij is intuitive:
28 Trade intermediation only arises as a
viable alternative to wholesale FDI if the distortion associated to it,
(
β˜1−σij
)
, is small enough
relative to the cost savings that the avoidance of wholesale FDI implies (φij) . If β˜ij < 1, for any
finite φij , there is a positive mass of firms that wish to establish a foreign sales affiliate. Note
the role of the elasticity of substitution between different varieties: if σ is very small, even a
small (effective) cost disadvantage implied by intermediation reduces export revenue by a large
amount, making wholesale FDI comparably attractive.
26Technically, this comes from ∂β˜ij/∂β¯ij > 0 and ∂β˜ij/∂λij > 0.
27We do not model direct exports (without intermediaries or wholesale FDI) because we do not have the data to
accommodate this mode. It would be fairly easy to incorporate this possibility into the model; e.g., by assuming
that direct exports require very high variable trade costs but low fixed costs. This would rationalize why that
mode is empirically rather unimportant.
28The condition does not suffice to make sure that there always exists a positive measure of firms that do not
serve the foreign market at all, i.e, that QDi < Q
M
ij . This inequality holds for some firms if
wj
wi
(
τ¯ij
β˜ij
)σ−1
Bi > Bj ,
where wi, wj , Bi, and Bj are endogenous objects which can be solved using the labor market clearing and balanced
trade conditions for all countries. As the focus of the present paper is not on whether firms export but rather on
how they do it, we refrain from determining these objects. We can derive our main theoretical results without
solving for wi, wj , Bi, and Bj .
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3.2 The prevalence of export modes
Changes in the prevalence of export modes do not only depend on movements along the extensive
margin, but also on changes along the intensive margin. Sales of firm Q in either mode are simple
log-linear functions of firms’ competitive advantage
sMij (Q) = σ
(
wiτ¯ij
βij
)1−σ
BjQ and sSij (Q) = σ (wiτ¯ij)
1−σ BjQ . (11)
Clearly, in each mode, sales are larger the greater is the degree of competitive advantage (Q),
the smaller are systematic transportation costs (τ¯ij) and the more income the foreign market
has (Bj) . The more severe the frictions caused by the hold-up problem 1/βij are, the lower sales
per firm channeled through intermediaries, whereas exports per firm via wholesale affiliates is
not affected by the lack of enforceable cross-country contracts.29
We can compute the value of total export sales of country i to country j that are facilitated
by trade intermediaries SMij = M
E
i
∫ ΦFij
ΦMij
sMij (Φ) dG (Φ) , where M
E
i is the mass of entrants in
country i. Similarly, we can derive total exports of i into j through own wholesale affiliates SFij .
The severity of the hold-up problem 1/βij affects intermediated export sales in several ways.
First, taking wages and market size as given, for any firm, a lower degree of contractual imper-
fections increases sales through intermediaries, see (11). Second, contractual imperfections affect
the selection of producers into the intermediated distribution mode. As 1/βij goes down, more
firms find it optimal to export through trade intermediaries and either choose to establish an
own wholesale affiliate abroad or stop exporting to market j completely; see (9) and (10). Hence,
a reduction of contractual imperfections has a positive effect on total intermediated export sales
both on the intensive and on the extensive margin. Ignoring general equilibrium effects, the
derivative of SMij with respect to βij is positive.
30
The risk of expropriation (φij) only affects the extensive margin. Clearly, a higher risk
of expropriation is associated with higher sales through trade intermediaries relative to sales
through own wholesale affiliates.
29These observations relate to direct effects only; σ, τ¯ij , βij also affect sales through Bj .
30This follows immediately from the considerations on the intensive and extensive margin above.
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Moreover, we can establish a link between the dispersion of the distribution of the compar-
ative advantage Q and the relative prevalence of export modes. A higher dispersion gives more
mass to firms with high values of Q, therefore shifting relative sales in favor of own wholesale
affiliates.
With Φ distributed according to the Pareto distribution, as assumed above, aggregate export
sales of country i to country j via intermediaries are given by
SMij = Ψijβ
σ−1
ij
β˜k−(σ−1)ij −
(
1− β˜σ−1ij
φij − 1
)k¯ , (12)
where k¯ ≡ kσ−1 − 1 is a constant, and Ψij is a shifting factor.31 Looking at the first order
effect only, intermediated exports from i to j increase when both countries involved are larger
or systematic trade costs τ¯ij are smaller. Intermediated exports also fall in f, the fixed costs
that any foreign market presence entails.
Similarly, we can derive total exports of i into j through own wholesale affiliates SFij . Eval-
uating SFij = M
E
i
∫∞
ΦFij
sFij (Φ) dG (Φ) , we have
SFij = Ψij
(
1− β˜σ−1ij
φij − 1
)k¯
. (13)
A rise in 1/βij now does not affect sales of each single exporter in the FDI mode directly, see
(11). Total sales to affiliates, however, increase as some firms switch from using intermediaries
to establishing own affiliates so that the cut-off value QFij falls; see (10).
We can can now express the relative prevalence of export modes as a function of exogenous
variables only.
Proposition 2 If the sorting condition holds and if firms’ degree of competitive advantage fol-
lows the Pareto distribution, the prevalence of export sales via trade intermediaries relative to
31The term Ψij is endogenously determined and given by Ψij =
σk
k−(σ−1)M
E
i B
k
σ−1
j (wiτ¯ij)
−k (fwj)
−k¯
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sales through affiliates, χij ≡ SMij /SFij , is
χij = βσ−1ij
( φij − 1
β˜1−σij − 1
)k¯
− 1
 .
This measure increases in the additional costs associated to linguistic, informational, or legal
issues φij and decreases in the severity of contractual problems 1/βij. It decreases in the degree
of dispersion of competitive advantage 1/k and falls in the elasticity of substitution σ. Moreover,
χij decreases in the dispersion of domestic sales, given by 1/ [k − (σ − 1)] . It is independent
from the size of the export market as given by Bj, the wage rates in either country, and from
transportation costs τ¯ij.
Not surprisingly, when the strength of contractual imperfections increases trade intermedi-
ation becomes more expensive relative to the use of an own wholesale affiliate; hence relative
prevalence of intermediation (χij) falls. On the other hand, sales through intermediaries are
more prevalent if the protection of property against expropriation is low (i.e., φij is high).
More interestingly, χij does not depend on the systematic component of transportation costs
(τ¯ij). This is due to the fact that sales in both distribution modes are affected by systematic
transportation costs in the same way. Approximating τ¯ij with bilateral geographical distance, it
follows that the relative prevalence of intermediation does not depend on geographical distance.
This is a prediction of our framework that is testable given adequate data. Also, relative
prevalence χij increases as firms become more homogeneous (k¯ →∞). In the extreme case, the
distribution of Q has a mass point at the lower bound of its support (here: normalized to unity).
If the condition in Proposition 2 is met, most firms cluster in the neighborhood of the lower
bound of the support and therefore export through intermediaries. As k¯ falls, more firms find
it optimal to establish own subsidiaries and χij falls.
4 Empirical evidence
In this section we present empirical evidence that is consistent with our Proposition 2. Since we
do not have firm-level data, we cannot directly verify the correlation between firm characteristics
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and the choice of export mode (Proposition 1). Akerman (2010) uses Swedish data and shows
(among other things) that our sorting result Proposition 1 holds.32
4.1 Data
In official data, exports to wholesale affiliates for the purpose of selling to foreign consumers
appear as within-firm trade. Hence, we use data on related-party and non-related party exports,
as collected by the U.S. Census.33 The data are based on export declarations and are publicly
available at 6-digit NAICS level. A “related party” is associated to an ownership share of at
least 10 percent. Trade between U.S parents and foreign affiliates is not distinguished from trade
between foreign production units in the U.S. and foreign parents.
While in the theoretical part of the paper we focus on trade in final goods, exports to affiliates
not only include final output goods but also intermediate inputs. This problem is common to
the literature. For example, the empirical analysis in HMY relies on export data from Feenstra
(1997) that do not distinguish final goods from imports either. However, as we have pointed
out in footnote 8, our setting is flexible enough to nest also trade in inputs without altering the
testable implications of the model.34
Using data on related and non-related party imports, Bernard et al. (2010b) analyze the
sourcing of imported inputs rather than the choice of export mode. While sales dispersion is
expected to determine both sourcing of inputs and choice of export mode, the set of other controls
differs substantially. In particular, our theoretical model stresses the risk that a wholesale
affiliate is confiscated by the foreign government. In order to test this hypothesis, we have to
allow for variation in destination country characteristics. We thus focus on U.S. exports rather
than U.S. imports.
32Akerman (2010) does not observe the export mode, but identifies intermediation by studying exports of
Swedish wholesalers. Using product and destination fixed effects, he finds that those wholesalers’ sales are ap-
proximately half those of manufactures who directly export. Abel-Koch (2010) more directly tests our theoretical
sorting prediction using Turkish survey data. She cannot, however, control for country characteristics which may
bias her results.
33Strictly speaking, non-related party trade also comprises exports directly to the consumer. Survey evidence
from different countries suggests that this mode is unimportant quantitatively (see, e.g., Trabold, 2002).
34Data provided by the Bureau of Economic analysis (BEA) show that about 35% of sales to foreign affiliates
are “goods for resale without further processing”. A comparable statistic on final good trade of unrelated parties
is not available. Moreover, the BEA data do not provide extensive product detail.
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The U.S. Census data do not contain zero trade flows but several missing values. We aggre-
gate the data from the 6-digit NAICS level to match the BEA 3-digit industry classification in
order to make our dependent variable comparable to the available covariates. Table 1 reports the
summary statistics. It shows that our measure of relative prevalence (the log thereof) exhibits
substantial variation across sectors and countries.
Our sales dispersion measure across industries comes from HMY.35 Their measure relates to
the mid of 1990s. Our analysis thus focuses on the first year the trade data are publicly available,
namely 2000. The sales dispersion measure is expected to negatively affect the relative prevalence
of trade intermediation.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(Relative prevalence) 2.016 1.617 −6.063 8.194
Dispersion 1.748 0.300 1.240 2.560
Specificity −0.132 0.192 −0.910 −0.003
ln(Freight) 4.674 0.071 4.605 5.676
Risk of confiscation 36.287 20.938 10 90
Common language 0.239 0.427 0 1
ln(Distance) 8.825 0.579 6.307 9.692
NAFTA 0.029 0.168 0 1
ln(Population) 16.505 1.654 12.428 20.956
N=3,461 country-and-industry pairs.
Our model predicts that the relative prevalence of trade intermediation is affected by the
effective bargaining power of the exporter which presumably depends on the specificity of her
product. If the product is specifically tailored to a foreign market, the hold-up problem becomes
more severe which lowers effective bargaining power. We re-interpret the measure of contract
intensity developed by Nunn (2007) as a measure of product specificity. He uses input-output
tables for 1997/98 to measure the proportion of inputs that are exchange-traded, reference
priced, or differentiated. We aggregate the value of incorporated inputs data from the 6-digit
IO-industry classification level to match the BEA 3-digit industry classification. Then, we
compute the product specificity as a share of incorporated inputs that are not exchange-traded
for each BEA industry. Our model predicts a negative relationship between product specificity
35They construct measures on the basis of different data sources for the US and Europe for 52 BEA 3-digit
manufacturing industries.
22
and the relative prevalence of trade intermediation.
Our measure for the risk of expropriation of physical assets by governments comes from the
Heritage Foundation. Higher levels of expropriation risk are expected to increase the relative
prevalence of intermediation. We also include a dummy for common language to account for
linguistic, cultural or more general informational problems that may be related to the setting
up of an own wholesale affiliate and hence drive up φij . Then, we expect a negative relationship
between the dummy and the relative prevalence of trade intermediation.
As an additional covariate, we include freight rates provided by Feenstra et al. (2002) at
a very disaggregate level. This data features both country and industry variation and needs
to be aggregated up to our level of sectoral detail. In our model the relative prevalence of
trade intermediation does not depend on trade costs. This is the case because trade costs affect
total sales through trade intermediaries and through own wholesale affiliates equiproportionally.
Hence, we do not expect a significant relationship between trade costs and the relative prevalence
of export modes. We also use geographical distance as an additional proxy for trade costs.36
Furthermore, we include a NAFTA dummy. NAFTA not only addresses tariffs, but also fosters
business relationships. The net effect on the relative prevalence of export modes is therefore a
priori ambiguous. In our regressions, we also consider country size measured by population.37
Whereas our model contains no predictions about country size, population is a common control
in the related literature.
4.2 Estimation strategy and results
We use a battery of regressions to address the theoretical predictions outlined in Proposition
2 on the relative prevalence of trade intermediation and its determinants.38 We exploit both
the country and the industry dimension of our data. Our dataset contains information for 3461
country-and-industry pairs.
Our empirical strategy is related to HMY. However, we discuss a different issue (the choice
36Distance and common language come from the CEPII.
37Population data are taken from the World Development Indicators.
38The working paper version of this article contains some additional results.
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of export mode versus the choice of location of production) and stress a different mechanism
(contractual imperfections versus concentration-proximity). While HMY study sales of foreign
affiliates versus export sales, our dependent variable relates export sales to intermediaries versus
those to foreign affiliates. Hence, our exercise is not subject to the criticism, that it is essentially
unknown where (and by whom) products sold by foreign affiliates have been produced.
Naive regressions. First, we run ‘naive’ regressions without controls for unobserved industry
or country characteristics. In order to address the endogeneity of the measure of firm size
dispersion to the relative prevalence of export modes, we instrument the US dispersion measure
by the similar measure for Western European firms. This strategy has been first proposed by
HMY.39
Table 2 presents the results. In column (1), we regress sector specific variables on relative
prevalence of trade intermediation, using the standard OLS estimator. We find that product
specificity is negatively correlated to prevalence, as predicted by our theory. The measure of
industry productivity dispersion, however, turns out insignificant, while – contrary to our theo-
retical exercise – the freight rate is statistically (albeit marginally so) significant. As discussed
above, the dispersion measure is prone to endogeneity and needs to be instrumented. In the
absence of instrumentation, all parameter estimates are biased. In particular, to the extent
that higher prevalence of intermediation increases the observed dispersion (by compressing the
sales distribution), OLS must overestimate the effect of dispersion. Column (2) shows that this
intuition bears out: when dispersion is instrumented, the effect falls strongly and becomes statis-
tically significant, fully in line with our theory.40 Moreover, the variable freight looses statistical
significance; this is also in line with theory.
We now focus specifically on country-specific variables. As long as dispersion is not used
as an explanatory variable, there is no need to use IV estimation. Column (3) shows the risk
39Unlike HMY we do not instrument the US dispersion measure by all four available European measures to
avoid overidentification problems. Our strategy passes a number of crucial econometric tests. However, the exact
choice of instruments is not important for our empirical results.
40Robust score test and Wooldridge regression test jointly signal that exogeneity of US dispersion has to be
rejected. Moreover, the first-stage F-statistic, the first-stage R2, and the first-stage partial R2 indicate validity of
the instrumentation strategy.
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Table 2: Relative prevalence of export modes. ‘Naive’ regressions.
Dependent variable: Relative prevalence of trade intermediation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS OLS IV IV
Dispersion 0.078 −0.850a 0.049 −0.917a −0.895a
(0.098) (0.192) (0.096) (0.189) (0.189)
Specificity −0.421a −0.489a −0.515a −0.589a −0.561a
(0.162) (0.166) (0.163) (0.167) (0.167)
ln(Freight) 1.260b 0.623 0.762 0.571 −0.124 −0.048
(0.526) (0.542) (0.530) (0.533) (0.555) (0.547)
Risk of confiscation 0.008a 0.008a 0.009a 0.007a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Common language −0.294a −0.297a −0.289a −0.251a
(0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063)
ln(Distance) 0.026 0.031 0.036 −0.087
(0.055) (0.054) (0.056) (0.050)
NAFTA −1.106a −1.111a −1.127a −1.467a
(0.160) (0.156) (0.161) (0.142)
ln(Population) −0.083a −0.086a −0.089a
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
RMSE 1.613 1.635 1.582 1.579 1.603 1.607
R2 0.006 n.a. 0.045 0.048 n.a. n.a.
First stage partial R2 0.245 0.245 0.245
N=3,461 country-and-industry pairs. Robust standard errors in parentheses. a and b indicate significance,
respectively, at 1% and 5%. All regressions include a constant (not shown). In IV regressions, US dispersion
is instrumented by European dispersion. Robust Wooldridge score test and regression-based test reject the
hypothesis that US dispersion is exogenous. R2 from IV estimation omitted; see Wooldridge (2009, p. 516) for
details.
of expropriation is statistically significantly positively correlated with the relative prevalence of
trade intermediaries. The dummy variable common language as proxy for linguistic problems in
setting up an own wholesale affiliate is statistically significantly negatively related to the relative
prevalence of trade intermediaries. Both results are in line with our theoretical predictions.
Additionally, we include a control for freight rate as a proxy for trade costs.41 As expected,
freight rate does not enter significantly. Similarly, the distance coefficient turns out to be
insignificant. This result allows to distinguish our model from the proximity-concentration
trade-off analyzed by HMY. The NAFTA dummy is negatively correlated with the relative
prevalence of trade intermediaries. This reveals that NAFTA does not only affect trade costs but
41Recall that this variable features country-and-industry variation.
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also enhances the business environment. Country size measured by population enters negatively.
While this result is not in line with our theory, it is common in the related empirical literature.42
Robustness checks. We check robustness of the results by controlling for unobserved country
and industry characteristics. We show results for fixed-effect estimation only, knowing that the
estimates are always consistent.43 Table 3 adds country fixed effects to regression (2) in Table
2; results turn out similar. However, it is noteworthy that both the estimated size and the
precision of the estimates increase quite substantially, while freight remains insignificant. These
findings support our theory. Moreover, they imply that unobserved country characteristics may
bias the results in Table 2 upwards; a finding that was already suggested by a comparison of
columns (2) and (5) in Table 2.
Similarly, controlling for unobserved industry characteristics (columns (3) and (4) in Table
3) leaves the results reported in Table 2 unchanged. All coefficients are of the same size and
level of statistical significance. Again, this feature does not depend on whether industry effects
are modeled as fixed or random.
Finally, we run a regression where we include both country and industry fixed effects. Given
the dimensionality of our data, we can only address the relationship between the relative preva-
lence of trade intermediaries and the freight rate. As expected, there is no statistically significant
correlation.
Summarizing, our empirical results are in line the key predictions of our model. They
support the view that the choice of export mode reflects a trade-off between the costs associated
to contractual frictions in the case of intermediation and to the cost of FDI in the case of
internalization.
42Bernard et al. (2010b) find a positive effect of population size on intra-firm imports; see their Table 7.
43In the working paper version of this article, we also use random-effects models, which may be more efficient.
Results are similar.
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Table 3: Relative prevalence of export modes. Controlling for unobserved characteristics.
Dependent variable: Relative prevalence of trade intermediation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV OLS OLS OLS
Dispersion 0.057 −0.976a
(0.092) (0.178)
Specificity −0.567a −0.648a
(0.155) (0.158)
ln(Freight) 0.059 −0.728 0.087 0.234 −0.481
(0.506) (0.524) (0.573) (0.566) (0.549)
Risk of confiscation 0.009a 0.007a
(0.001) (0.001)
Common language −0.288a −0.249a
(0.061) (0.060)
ln(Distance) 0.044 −0.091
(0.053) (0.047)
NAFTA −1.106a −1.471a
(0.159) (0.140)
ln(Population) −0.098a
(0.019)
Country fixed effects YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES
RMSE 1.461 1.464 1.519 1.525 1.385
R2 0.215 n.a. 0.132 0.124 0.305
First stage partial R2 0.244
N=3,461 country-and-industry pairs. Robust standard errors in parentheses. a indicates signifi-
cance at 1%. All regressions include a constant (not shown). In IV regressions, US dispersion is
instrumented by European dispersion. Robust Wooldridge score test and regression-based test re-
ject the hypothesis that US dispersion is exogenous. R2 from IV estimation omitted; see Wooldridge
(2009, p. 516) for details.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have discussed the choice between two different modes of exporting to a foreign
market: a producer can either use a foreign trade intermediary, who enjoys a fixed cost advantage
but – due to the lack of enforceable cross-country contracts – exposes the producer to a hold-up
problem, or they can establish an own wholesale affiliate, avoiding the threat of hold-up at the
cost of increased investment. This trade-off produces an interesting sorting pattern of producers
into the two export modes. Firms with high perceived quality of their products, low variable
production costs, and strong marketability of goods prefer to establish affiliates; firms with
low realizations of those characteristics prefer to use trade intermediaries. The reason is that
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contractual frictions reduce variable revenues proportionally, while the fixed-cost disadvantage
of affiliates does not depend on sales. Hence, firms with high sales opt for wholesale subsidiaries
in the foreign country.
Importantly, in our model, variable trade costs are endogenously determined in the game
between the producer and the intermediary. However, the contractual frictions are not isomor-
phic to the usual iceberg-type trade costs, since they do not lead to a loss of output. Rather,
they imply an additional restriction of production by monopolistically competitive firms, so
that the markup goes up. Hence, our model warns against modeling differences across modes
as exogenous differences in iceberg-type variable trade costs.
Under the assumption of the Pareto distribution, we show that the relative prevalence of
intermediation does not depend on transportation costs between the source and the destination
country, on market size or on wage rates. It increases with the risk of expropriation of physical
assets and in the degree of heterogeneity of producers. It falls with the severity of contractual
problems.
Our paper is related to HMY. While we discuss a different issue (the choice of export mode
versus the choice of location of production) and stress a different mechanism (contractual imper-
fections versus concentration-proximity), we can use a related empirical strategy on US census
data to assess the predictions of the model. We find that most predictions of our theory are in
line with the data.
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A Proofs and detailed derivations
Proof of Lemma 1 (pricing behavior). The producer maximizes her expected profits from
exporting via a trade intermediary subject to the demand function to choose her optimal quantity
to supply in the match. Using optimal demand to substitute out the c.i.f price and inserting (5)
the solves
max
xMij (ω)
β¯ijJij (ω) + p˜iPij (ω)− xMij (ω) τij (ω) a (ω)wi
= max
xMij (ω)
β¯ijp
M
ij (ω)x
M
ij (ω) +
[(
1− β¯ij
)
λij − 1
]
xMij (ω) τij (ω) a (ω)wi
= max
xMij (ω)
β¯ij (Hj)
1/σ ζ (ω)(σ−1)/σ
[
xMij (ω)
](σ−1)/σ
+
[(
1− β¯ij
)
λij − 1
]
xMij (ω) τij (ω) a (ω)wi
The first order condition is
ρβ¯ij (Hj)
1
σ ζ (ω)
σ−1
σ
[
xMij (ω)
]− 1
σ =
[(
1− β¯ij
)
λij − 1
]
τij (ω) a (ω)wi.
Substituting xMij (ω) yields the pricing rule stated in Lemma 1
pMij (ω) =
τij (ω) a (ω)wi
βijρ
,
where βij = βij
(
β¯ij , λij
)
= β¯ij/
[
1− λij
(
1− β¯ij
)] ≥ β¯ij .
Comparative statics related to Lemma 1. The additional markup is inverse proportional
to the degree of contractual imperfections βij . βij
(
β¯ij , λij
)
is increasing in the bargaining power
β¯ij and the recycling rate λij
∂βij
(
β¯ij , λij
)
∂β¯ij
=
1− λij(
1− λij
(
1− β¯ij
))2 > 0,
∂βij
(
β¯ij , λij
)
∂λij
=
(
1− β¯ij
)
β¯ij(
1− λij
(
1− β¯ij
))2 > 0.
The term β˜ij = β˜ij (βij , σ) ≡ [βij + (1− βij)σ]
1
σ−1 βij ≥ βij is closely related to our measure of
contractual imperfections βij . We have β˜ij (0, σ) = 0 and β˜ij (1, σ) = 1β˜ij is strictly increasing
in βij for βij ∈ (0, 1)
∂β˜ij (βij , σ)
∂βij
=
β˜ij
β
(
1− βij
βij + (1− βij)σ
)
> 0,
since βij/ [βij + (1− βij)σ] < 1.
The derivative with respect to σ is given by
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∂β˜ij
∂σ
= β˜ij
(
− ln [βij + (1− βij)σ]
(σ − 1)2 +
1− βij
[βij + (1− βij)σ]
)
∂β˜ij
∂σ
=
β˜ij
σ − 1
βij + (1− βij)σ − 1− [βij + (1− βij)σ] ln [βij + (1− βij)σ]
(σ − 1) [βij + (1− βij)σ] < 0.
β˜ij is strictly decreasing in σ, since x−1x < lnx, where x = βij + (1− βij)σ.
Moreover, β˜ij is well behaved in the limiting cases
lim
σ→1
β˜ij (βij , σ) = βij exp
[
lim
σ→1
(
ln (βij + (1− βij)σ)
σ − 1
)]
= βij exp
[
lim
σ→1
(
1− βij
βij + (1− βij)σ
)]
= βije1−βij ,
lim
σ→∞ β˜ij (βij , σ) = βij exp
[
lim
σ→∞
(
ln (βij + (1− βij)σ)
σ − 1
)]
= βij exp
[
lim
σ→1
(
1− βij
βij + (1− βij)σ
)]
= βij .
Proof of Proposition 1 (Sorting). The cutoff QMij immediately follows from rearranging
(8)
QMij =
(
wiτ¯ij
β˜ij
)σ−1
fjB
−1
j .
QFij is determined by solving pi
M
ij
(
QFij
)
= piFij
(
QFij
)
for QFij
(wiτ¯ij)
1−σ BjQFij − φijfj =
(
wiτ¯ij
β˜ij
)1−σ
BjQ
F
ij − fj
QFij = (wiτ¯ij)
σ−1
(
φij − 1
1− β˜σ−1ij
)
fjB
−1
j
= QMij
(
φij − 1
β˜1−σij − 1
)
Sorting exists, if QFij is strictly larger than Q
M
ij :
(wiτ¯ij)
σ−1
(
φij − 1
1− β˜σ−1ij
)
fjB
−1
j >
(
wiτ¯ij
β˜ij
)σ−1
fjB
−1
j
φij − 1 > β˜1−σij
(
1− β˜σ−1ij
)
φij > β˜
1−σ
ij .
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Derivations of equations (12) and (13) (Export sales per mode). Sales per firm from
exporting via a trade intermediary are given by
sMij (ω) = p
M
ij (ω)x
M
ij
[
pMij (ω)
]
= Hj
[
pMij (ω)
ζ (ω)
]1−σ
sMij (Q) = σ
(
wiτ¯ij
βij
)1−σ
QBj .
UsingQ = Φ(1−σ) and the Pareto distribution, total exports via intermediaries can be calculated
as
SMij = M
E
i σ
(
wi
τ¯ij
βij
)1−σ
Bjk
∫ ΦFij
ΦMij
Φσ−k−2dΦ
= MEi
(
wi
τ¯ij
βij
)1−σ
Bj
σk
k − (σ − 1)
[(
ΦMij
)σ−k−1 − (ΦFij)σ−k−1]
= MEi σ
(
wi
τ¯ij
βij
)1−σ
Bj
σk
k − (σ − 1)
(
ΦFij
)σ−k−1 ( φij − 1
β˜1−σij − 1
) k−(σ−1)
σ−1
− 1

= MEi (wiτ¯ij)
−k B
k
σ−1
j f
−k¯
j
σk
k − (σ − 1)β
σ−1
ij
(
φij − 1
1− β˜σ−1ij
)σ−k−1
σ−1
( φij − 1
β˜1−σij − 1
) k−(σ−1)
σ−1
− 1

= Ψijβσ−1ij
β˜k−(σ−1)ij −
(
1− β˜σ−1ij
φij − 1
)k¯ .
The last expression is equivalent to (12) in the text. Analogously, sales per firm from
exporting via a wholesale affiliate take the form
sFij (ω) = pij (ω)xij [pij (ω)]
sFij (Q) = σ (wiτ¯ij)
1−σ QBj ,
and
SFij = M
E
i σ (wiτ¯ij)
1−σ Bjk
∫ Φ∞ij
ΦFij
Φσ−k−2dΦ
= MEi (wiτ¯ij)
1−σ Bj
σk
k − (σ − 1)
(
ΦFij
)σ−k−1
= Ψij
(
1− β˜σ−1ij
φij − 1
)k¯
.
which corresponds to (13) in the text. Note that
k¯ =
k
σ − 1 − 1.
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Proof of Proposition 2 (Relative prevalence). The relative prevalence of export modes
χij ≡ SMij /SFij follows immediatly from (12) and (13)
χij =
βσ−1ij
[
β˜
k−(σ−1)
ij −
(
1−β˜σ−1ij
φij−1
)k¯]
(
1−β˜σ−1ij
φij−1
)k¯
= βσ−1ij
β˜k−(σ−1)ij
(
φij − 1
1− β˜σ−1ij
)−k¯
− 1

= βσ−1ij
( φij − 1
β˜1−σij − 1
)k¯
− 1
 .
Comparative statics results are derived as follows:
dχij
dφij
φij
χij
= k¯
φij
φij − 1
(
φij−1
β˜1−σij −1
)k¯
(
φij−1
β˜1−σij −1
)k¯
− 1
> 0
dχij
dβij
βij
χij
= (σ − 1)
1 +
β˜1−σij
β˜1−σij −1(
φij−1
β˜1−σij −1
)k¯
− 1
k¯
dβ˜ij
dβij
βij
dβ˜ij
 > 0,
since dβ˜ijdβij
βij
dβ˜ij
> 0 and φij−1
β˜1−σij −1
> 1 (Lemma 2).
dχij
dτ¯ij
τ¯ij
χij
= 0
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